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PROPERTY LAW
Charles H. Rothenberg*
Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the General Assembly ad-
dressed important issues affecting property law in Virginia over
the past year. For instance, the Virginia Supreme Court considered
for the first time the extent to which dominant estate owners could
improve rights of way benefiting their property. The General As-
sembly has gone a long way toward vitiating the long held caveat
emptor rule predominant in Virginia by adopting a residential
sales disclosure statute. These and other important cases and stat-
utes are discussed below.
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Contracts
A party to a contract for the purchase of land may lose his right
to rescind the contract for valid reasons if the party continues to
treat the contract as an existing contract and misleads the other
party to believe that the contract is still in effect. The Virginia
Supreme Court applied this rule in McLeskey v. Ocean Park In-
vestors, Ltd.1 to estop a contract purchaser from rescinding a 1979
installment sales contract for the purchase of subdivided but un-
improved lots after seeking earlier to specifically enforce the
contract.2
In 1981, the purchaser filed suit to specifically enforce the con-
tract. The court dismissed the suit in 1987 for failure to prosecute.
In 1988, the purchaser brought suit against the seller seeking to
rescind the contract.' The Virginia Supreme Court held that the
1981 suit constituted the purchaser's election to treat the contract
* Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1984,
State University of New York, College at Oneonta; J.D., 1987, T.C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond.
1. 242 Va. 51, 405 S.E.2d 846 (1991).
2. Id. at 55, 405 S.E.2d at 848.
3. Id. at 54, 405 S.E.2d at 848.
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as valid and enforceable, thereby estopping the purchaser from
adopting a position contrary to that election.4
B. Deeds of Trust
In Allen v. Chapman,5 a case of first impression, the Virginia
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a junior lienor
should be characterized as a party in interest for purposes of the
statute of limitations contained in section 8.01-242 of the Code of
Virginia ("Code").' The facts were as follows. In 1969, Charles and
Margaret Chapman acquired property in Norfolk from Billy and
Bernadette Chapman. Charles and Margaret executed a $90,000
demand note payable to Billy and Bernadette secured by a deed of
trust recorded against the property. In 1973, Charles and Margaret
conveyed the property to a subsequent purchaser. The purchaser
executed an $80,000 note payable to Charles and Margaret. In
1982, the Youngs acquired the property and assumed the $80,000
note.7
Shortly after Charles Chapman's death in 1988, the Youngs dis-
covered the deed of trust securing the $90,000 note and sought a
declaratory judgment finding the deed of trust invalid. Billy and
Bernadette Chapman sued to enforce the deed of trust. The
Youngs argued that the twenty-year limitations period set forth in
section 8.01-242 barred the enforcement of the deed of trust.'
However, Billy and Bernadette argued that the twenty-year period
was extended one year because of Charles Chapman's death.'
4. Id. at 55, 405 S.E.2d at 848. The court acknowledged that a party may pray for both
rescission and specific performance in the alternative. Id.; see VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:4(k). The
court noted that the purchaser treated the contract as valid from 1981 to 1987 when the
trial court dismissed the purchaser's first suit for specific performance. In addition, the pur-
chaser sought neither to plead both remedies in the alternative nor to amend the specific
performance suit. Id.
5. 242 Va. 94, 406 S.E.2d 186 (1991).
6. Id. at 96, 406 S.E.2d at 186. Section 8.01-242 provides as follows:
No deed of trust or mortgage given to secure the payment of money, and no lien
reserved to secure the payment of unpaid purchase money, in which no date is fixed
for the maturity of the debt secured by such deed of trust, mortgage, or lien, shall be
enforced after twenty years from the date of the deed of trust, mortgage, or other
lien; provided that the period of one year from the death of any party in interest shall
be excluded from the computation of time.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-242 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
7. Allen, 242 Va. at 96, 406 S.E.2d at 187.
8. Id. at 97, 406 S.E.2d at 187.
9. Id.
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The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Billy and Bernadette,
finding that a foreclosure under the deed of trust securing the
$90,000 note would eliminate the security for the $80,000 note pay-
able to Charles and Margaret Chapman. Therefore, Charles Chap-
man, or his estate, was a party in interest for purposes of the one
year extension to the statute of limitations. 10
The court also determined that the purpose of section 8.01-242
is two-fold. First, the section provides the personal representative
of the decedent time to analyze claims against the estate. The sec-
ond purpose of the section is to give "'creditors of the estate, with
perhaps less reason but with just reciprocity, a corresponding ex-
tension of time.' "" Therefore, both Charles Chapman's estate and
Billy and Bernadette Chapman, as creditors of the estate, were en-
titled to the one year extension.12
In Garrison v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n,5 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that interest charged by a second deed
of trust lienholder in excess of that permitted by Virginia's usury
laws voids the loan. Landbank Equity Corporation originated a
$9,224.19 loan in 1984 and shortly thereafter sold the note to First
Federal. Garrison defaulted on the loan in 1985 and First Federal
began foreclosure proceedings. Garrison sought a judgment re-
forming the loan or declaring the loan void under Virginia's
subordinate mortgage laws. The trial court, finding that voiding
the loan would be inequitable, reformed the loan and Garrison
appealed. 14
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected all of First Federal's argu-
ments supporting the trial court's reformation and declared the
loan void.' 5 The court first rejected First Federal's assertion that,
since the savings and loan was neither an agent nor a principal of
10. Id. at 97-98, 406 S.E.2d at 187. The court analogized a party in interest under section
8.01-242 with a necessary party in a judicial foreclosure. Id.; see Rector v. Tazewell Coal &
Iron Co., 179 Va. 803, 20 S.E.2d 504 (1942) (administratrix of owner of property is a neces-
sary party to a suit to enforce a vendor's lien securing repayment of notes even though
statute of limitations bars personal liability on notes); 1 RALEIGH C. MINOR, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 606 (Frederick D.G. Ribble 2d ed. 1928) (all encumbrancers at the time of
filing bill for judicial foreclosure should be made parties in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits, make final distribution of sale proceeds, and give foreclosure purchaser clear title).
11. Allen, 242 Va. at 101, 406 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting Boggs v. Fatherly, 177 Va. 259, 264,
13 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1941)).
12. Id.
13. 241 Va. 335, 402 S.E.2d 25 (1991).
14. Id. at 338, 402 S.E.2d at 27.
15. Id. at 339, 402 S.E.2d at 27.
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Landbank, the loan was free from application of Code section 6.1-
330.47(A).' 6 According to the court, First Federal's restrictive con-
struction of section 6.1-330.47(A) would protect loans where the
assignee was neither an agent nor a principal of the originating
lender, even if the loan was otherwise void.17
The court next rejected First Federal's argument that the loan
risk management fees and excess appraisal costs charged the Gar-
risons were not "interest" as that term is used in section 6.1-
330.47(A), and, therefore were allowable.' 8 The supreme court
noted that "[i]t is well settled that any charge which cannot be
attributed to either principal or to an allowed charge for collateral
service is considered interest." 9 Therefore, the loan discount
charge, risk management charge, and excess appraisal charge im-
posed by Landmark Equity all constituted interest under section
6.1-330.47(A).2 e
First Federal also unsuccessfully argued that while the loan dis-
count charge exceeded that permitted under Virginia law, the
charge was disclosed to the Garrisons on a federal truth-in-lending
statement. First Federal reasoned that this disclosure brought the
16. Id. at 341, 402 S.E.2d at 28. Section 6.1-330.47(A) provides that:
Any contract, note, mortgage, or deed of trust made or received and providing for
interest charges in excess of those permitted by §§ 6.1-330.16 and 6.1-330.24, except
as hereinafter provided, shall be null and void and unenforceable by the lender or by
his assignees, who are agents or principals of the lender.
The provisions of this section shall apply only to loans made under § 6.1-330.16
and shall not apply to any contract or note, or mortgage or deed of trust securing
such obligation, which has been assigned to a person who is not the agent or principal
of the lender, if such assignee has taken the note or obligation in good faith and in
reasonable reliance upon the provisions of § 6.1-330.44.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.47(A) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
17. Id. at 342, 402 S.E.2d at 28-29. Section 6.1-330.44 provides, in part that:
No person shall, by way of defense or otherwise, avail himself of the provisions of this
chapter, or any other section relating to usury to avoid or defeat the payment of
interest, or any other sum, when such loan is made to an individual or individuals or
other entity by a financial institution as defined in § 6.1-2.1 or for the acquisition or
conduct of business or investment as a sole proprietor, owner, or joint venturers or
owners provided the initial amount of the loan is $5,000 or more.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.44, repealed by Act of Mar. 27, ch. 622, 1987 Va. Acts 1026.
18. Garrison, 241 Va. at 344, 402 S.E.2d at 29.
19. Id. at 342, 402 S.E.2d at 29 (citing Chakales v. Djiovanides, 161 Va. 48, 86-93, 170 S.E.
848, 861-64 (1933).
20. Id. at 343, 402 S.E.2d at 28. The court noted that under Virginia Code sections 6.1-
330.16(E) and -330.24 only the actual cost of an appraisal may be charged to the borrower
and no provision is made for a risk management fee. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-
330.16(E), -330.24, repealed by Act of Mar. 27, ch. 622, 1987 Va. Acts 1026.
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loan under the safe harbor of Code section 6.1-330.16(E).2 The
court disagreed, noting that First Federal's interpretation of sec-
tion 6.1-330.16 would permit lenders to impose any charges as long
as the charges were disclosed on truth-in-lending statements.22
C. Deeds
In Princess Anne Hills Civic League, Inc. v. Susan Constant
Real Estate Trust,23 the Virginia Supreme Court considered the
validity of a deed from a homeowners' association conveying prop-
erty designated on a subdivision plat as reserved for the benefit of
homeowners in the subdivision. A subdivision plat depicting a wa-
terfront parcel included a notation to the effect that the waterfront
parcel would be "transferred to Strattons Creek Club, a corpora-
tion, for recreation facilities. '24 The club was never formed, but
the evidence indicated that the club was to have been reserved for
the recreational and social benefit of all of the homeowners in the
development.25 The developer conveyed the waterfront parcel to
the Princess Anne Hills Civic League, for the benefit of all of the
homeowners in the development, in consideration of the civic
league's assumption of the upkeep and real estate tax liability for
the property.26
Hollenbeck, the owner of a lot in the development, obtained the
signature of the new president of the association on a deed convey-
ing the waterfront parcel to a trust. The deed, which the president
executed without the approval of the association's board or mem-
bers, provided that the trust would manage the waterfront parcel
for all of the homeowners entitled to use the parcel.2 7 However, the
recorded declaration of trust provided that the trust would hold
the parcel for the benefit of eight specified lots in the development
for the purpose of "preserv[ing] the boat docking privileges and for
21. Garrison, 241 Va. at 343, 402 S.E.2d at 30.
22. Id. at 344, 402 S.E.2d at 30.
23. 243 Va. 53, 413 S.E.2d 599 (1992).
24. Id. at 56, 413 S.E.2d at 601.
25. Id. The evidence indicated further that even though the club was never formed, the
developer did not change the notation on the plat or designate another beneficiary for the
waterfront parcel. Therefore, all of the homeowners in the development took title to their
lots subject to the notation. Id.
26. Id. at 57, 413 S.E.2d at 601.
27. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 602.
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the payment of taxes and expenses."" The association sought to
set the deed aside.29
The Virginia Supreme Court disposed of two equitable argu-
ments interposed by Hillenbrand and the trust to defeat the asso-
ciation's suit. First, the court determined that, notwithstanding the
fact that Hollenbeck maintained the waterfront parcel for eight
years after the trust took title to the parcel and that the trust paid
the real estate taxes on the parcel during that time, the doctrine of
laches did not bar the association from seeking to set aside the
deed.30 The court also refused to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel as a defense to the association's action to set aside the
deed.-"
Moving on to the merits of the case, the court determined that
the association clearly held title to the waterfront parcel for the
benefit of all of the homeowners in the development. And since the
president of the association executed the deed conveying the parcel
to the trust without complying with the applicable statutory re-
quirements for disposing of the association's sole asset, the deed
was ultra vires and voidable.32 The court found no evidence of rati-
fication of the conveyance to the trust by the association. The as-
sociation did not vote to ratify the conveyance at a meeting held
shortly after the conveyance, even though the matter was dis-
cussed. The court also found no evidence in the record to support
the trust's assertion that the membership acquiesced to the
conveyance."3
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 603. The court noted that the passage of time did not obscure evi-
dence that was unavailable from alternative sources. Id.
31. Id. at 59, 413 S.E.2d at 603. The court found no evidence supporting the trust's estop-
pel defense. In fact, the trust conceded that no vote by the association's membership was
taken to approve the transfer of the waterfront parcel to the trust. Id.
32. Id. at 60, 413 S.E.2d at 603; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-246, repealed by Act of Mar. 24,
1985, ch. 522, 1985 Va. Acts 866. The court noted that the conveyance was voidable as
opposed to void because the statute permitted the transfer of the association's property
provided that certain conditions were satisfied. Princess Anne, 243 Va. at 60, 413, S.E.2d at
603. The distinction is important because, as the court noted, a voidable act may be ratified,
while a void act is completely null. Id. at 61, 413 S.E.2d at 604 (citing Crump v. Bronson,
168 Va. 527, 537, 191 S.E. 663, 667 (1937)).
33. Princess Anne, 243 Va. at 62, 413 S.E.2d at 604.
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D. Division Fences
A 1970 amendment to Virginia's division fence statutes survived
a constitutional attack in Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. Rowe.3 4 Holly
Hill, the owner of a cattle farm in Caroline County, sought to re-
cover from the adjoining landowners one-half of the cost of erect-
ing a division fence along each owner's boundary with Holly Hill's
property. The adjoining landowners questioned the constitutional-
ity of the division fence statute, claiming that it constituted imper-
missible special legislation favoring agricultural landowners at the
expense of owners of commercial lands and subdivided lots.
3 5
The Virginia Supreme Court found that the adjoining landown-
ers failed to meet their substantial burden of showing that the
statute has no reasonable basis and is essentially arbitrary.36 The
court noted that in many cases agricultural properties are much
larger than commercial properties and subdivided lots. Had the
General Assembly vested owners of commercial lands or subdi-
vided lots with control over the construction of division fences, one
owner of a small property could elect not to install a fence and
thereby destroy the continuity of the fence around the adjacent
agricultural property.37 Based on this scenario, the deferential
treatment afforded agricultural land owners under the statute is
reasonable, appropriate, and objective.3
34. 241 Va. 425, 404 S.E.2d 48 (1991). The statute in question, Code section 55-317, pro-
vides, in part, that
Adjoining landowners shall build and maintain, at their joint and equal expense, divi-
sion fences between their lands, unless one of them shall choose to let his land lie
open as hereinafter provided for, or unless they shall otherwise agree between them-
selves. No owner of land used for industrial or commercial purposes, or subdivided
into lots or parcels, adjoining lands used for agricultural purposes, when given notice
by the owner of such adjoining lands under § 55-318 shall have the option of choosing
to let his land lie open, but shall build one-half of such fence or be liable therefor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-317 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
35. Rowe, 241 Va. at 428-29, 404 S.E.2d at 49.
36. Id. at 430-31, 404 S.E.2d at 50. The court found that the provisions of the division
fence statute are "general" and not special in nature in that they favor all agricultural land-
owners over all commercial land owners and owners of subdivided lots. Id.
37. Id. at 431, 404 S.E.2d at 51.
38. Id. at 433, 404 S.E.2d at 52. Justice Lacy, citing major flaws in the majority's opinion,
dissented. See id. at 433, 404 S.E.2d at 52 (Lacy, J. dissenting). Agricultural lands may not
always be the largest tract in an area and the adjacent properties may not be commercial
properties or subdivided lots. In Justice Lacy's opinion, section 55-317 is poorly drafted to
accomplish the goal intended by the General Assembly. Id. at 434, 404 S.E.2d at 52.
1992]
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E. Easements
In Hayes v. Aquia Marina, Inc.,3 9 the Virginia Supreme Court
considered for the first time whether a dominant estate owner had
the right to make improvements to a right of way. The case arose
when the owner of the marina sought to pave a dirt and gravel
road providing access to a marina. The court adopted the rule that
"the owner of a dominant estate has the right to make reasonable
improvements to an easement, so long as the improvement does
not unreasonably increase the burden upon the servient estate. '40
The court also found nothing in the record indicating that the ma-
rina owner's expansion of the marina from eight-four boat slips to
240 boat slips would impose any additional burden upon the servi-
ent estate, even though the expansion could increase the degree of
burden on the servient estate owner.4'
The language in many declarations of covenants permitting en-
croachment onto one lot from another found an unexpected appli-
cation in Edmiston Homes, Ltd. v. McKinney Group.42 The case
arose when Edmiston, a builder, sought to construct a zero lot line
house on a subdivided lot in Henrico County. The county code re-
quired an eight foot easement on the adjacent lot for construction
and maintenance of the house to be located on the zero lot line
lot.43 The easement was not designated on the plat or any docu-
ment affecting title to the adjacent lot. However, a declaration of
covenants affecting the adjacent lot provided that each lot in the
subdivision would be subject to an easement for encroachments
from adjacent lots. 44
39. 243 Va. 255, 414 S.E.2d 820 (1992).
40. Id. at 261, 414 S.E.2d at 823. The court also considered whether the agreement creat-
ing the right of way placed any limitation on the scope of the use of the right of way. Id.
The court agreed with the trial court that a reference in the agreement to "private roadway"
merely distinguished the right of way area from another roadway that the parties to the
agreement intended to dedicate to the state for perpetual maintenance. Id. at 259, 414
S.E.2d at 822.
41. Id. at 258, 414 S.E.2d at 822 (citing Cushman Corp. v. Barnes, 204 Va. 245, 253, 129
S.E.2d 633, 639 (1963) (unless instrument creating easement limits it to particular use, rea-
sonable change in use of dominant estate does not affect easement)).
42. 241 Va. 263, 401 S.E.2d 875 (1991).
43. Id. at 265, 401 S.E.2d at 876.
44. Id. at 266, 401 S.E.2d at 877. Tlie relevant part of the restrictive covenants provided
that:
Each Owner is hereby declared to have an easement and the same is hereby granted
by the Declarant over all adjoining parcels for the purpose of accomodating [sic] any
encroachment due to engineering errors, errors in original construction, settlement or
shifting of building, or any other cause. There shall be valid easements for the main-
1992] PROPERTY LAW
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that,
given the nature of zero lot line houses, a house could not be con-
structed on a lot without encroaching on the adjacent lot and that
the "or any other cause" phrase of the encroachment easement
language in the restrictive covenants applied to the facts before it.
Therefore, the easement language accrued to the benefit of the
owner of the zero lot line house.45
In Davis -v. Cleve Marsh Hunt Club,4 the Virginia Supreme
Court was asked to determine whether the hunt club had obtained
an enforceable access easement over Davis' property. The hunt
club acquired certain marsh land from Davis for hunting purposes.
The sales contract referenced certain access rights and a lease for
other marsh land and access rights to the property.47 Davis argued
that the contract terms merged into the deed and lease leaving the
hunt club without the most desirable right of access referenced in
the sales contract.48
The court, relying on language in the sales contract indicative of
a present intent to convey, held that the sales contract conveyed
the access easement to the hunt club.49 Since the contract actually
effected the conveyance of the access easement, and therefore did
tenance of said encroachment, settlement or shifting; provided however, that in no
event shall a valid easement for encroachment be created in favor of an Owner or
Owners if said encroachment occurred due to the willful or wanton misconduct of
said Owner or Owners. In the event that a structure on any Lot is partially or totally
destroyed, and then repaired or rebuilt, the Owners of each Lot agree that minor
encroachment over adjoining Lots shall be permitted and that there shall be valid
easements for the maintenance of said encroachment so long as they shall exist.
Id. at 267, 401 S.E.2d at 877.
45. Id. at 268, 401 S.E.2d at 878. The court, noting that any attempt to comply with the
county zero lot line provision would result in an encroachment, also agreed with the trial
court's decision that the encroachment was not willful. Id.
46. 242 Va. 29, 405 S.E.2d 839 (1991).
47. Id. at 31, 405 S.E.2d at 840.
48. Id. at 33, 405 S.E.2d at 840.
49. Id., 405 S.E.2d at 841. The pertinent part of the sales contract provided as follows:
It is further agreed between the parties that the [Davises] hereby give the [hunt club]
right of ways to existing landings from state highway through Davis Farm property in
Caroline County of Conway Davis and Genevieve Davis and their heirs or assigns who
may later have an interest in this farm.
Id. at 31, 405 S.E.2d at 840. The court noted that had the contract stated that the Davises
"hereby agree to convey," or used similar words, the contract, as to the access easement,
would have been executory. However, the language used in the contract clearly evidenced
the Davises' intent to create in the hunt club a present interest in the access easement. Id.
at 34, 405 S.E.2d at 841.
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not constitute an executory contract, the provision regarding the
conveyance of the access easement did not merge with the deed. °
F. Eminent Domain
Lessees of property used for installing billboards are not entitled
to a separate condemnation proceeding to determine just compen-
sation upon a condemnation of the underlying leasehold property,
according to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Lamar Corp.
v. City of Richmond.5 The lessees sought a separate condemnation
action with respect to their interests in the property and refused to
intervene in the city's eminent domain proceedings against the
property. Notwithstanding this protest by the lessees, counsel for
the owner of the property and the lessees endorsed an order set-
ting just compensation for the property.52 The lessees appealed on
the grounds that the city's actions constituted a taking without
just compensation for the lessees' leasehold interests in the prop-
erty and ownership interests in the billboards. 3
The Virginia Supreme Court noted that where a lessee has an
interest in property, the proper course of action in a condemnation
proceeding is to determine just compensation for the property as if
owned by one party and then apportion that sum among the inter-
ested parties.5 4 A lessee does not have an interest in the property
separate from that of the owner. 5 The court also ruled that the
billboards, which were firmly affixed to the realty, constituted re-
alty, and that the lessees held a compensable interest in the bill-
boards. However, the court further held that the compensation
50. Id. at 34, 405 S.E.2d at 841. "'[W]here a deed has been executed and accepted as
performance of an executory contract ... [,] the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely
on the deed.'" Id. at 33, 405 S.E.2d at 841 (citing Charles v. McClanahan, 130 Va. 682, 685,
108 S.E. 858, 859 (1921)).
51. 251 Va. 346, 402 S.E.2d 31 (1991).
52. Id. at 348-49, 402 S.E.2d at 32.
53. Id. at 349, 402 S.E.2d at 33. The leases provided that the lessees would be the exclu-
sive owners of the billboards installed on the leasehold property. Id. at 348, 402 S.E.2d at
32.
54. Id. at 350, 402 S.E.2d at 33 (citing Fonticello Mineral Springs Co. v. City of Rich-
mond, 147 Va. 355, 369, 137 S.E. 458, 463 (1927)). The lessees also contended that the city's
condemnation was void because the city failed to give the lessees, as "tenants of the free-
hold," proper notice of the condemnation. The court found that the mere presence of the
billboards was insufficient to make the lessees "tenants of the freehold." Lamar, 251 Va. at
350, 402 S.E.2d at 33 (following Fonticello, 147 Va. at 369, 137 S.E. at 462 (a tenant of the
freehold is a tenant in possession appearing as the visible owner)).
55. Lamar, 251 Va. at 350, 402 S.E.2d at 33.
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award for the freehold already included compensation for the bill-
boards.5 6 Unfortunately, the lessees, through their counsel, had al-
ready consented to the payment of the compensation to the free-
hold owner.57
G. Fraudulent Conveyances
Intent to create a trust is not a condition precedent to establish-
ing a constructive trust at law, the Virginia Supreme Court noted
in Richardson v. Richardson.5" In Richardson, the wife of a dece-
dent sought to recover title to property conveyed to her husband
by his mother as a gift. In anticipation of a divorce, the husband,
without consideration, reconveyed the property to his mother in an
effort to circumvent any rights his wife would have in the property.
His mother, without consideration, conveyed the property to her
other son, the decedent's brother. The decedent and his wife sub-
sequently reconciled. The trial court, finding that the husband's
brother would be unjustly enriched by the conveyance, imposed a
constructive trust on the property in favor of the wife based on
testimony of the decedent's wife and children that the decedent
did not intend to relinquish his rights in the property.59
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the intent of
the parties, while irrelevant to the creation of the constructive
trust, did bear on the issue of unjust enrichment. The court found
that the testimony of the decedent's children and wife to the effect
that the husband did not intend completely to relinquish his rights
in the property, and thereby enrich his mother or brother, was suf-
ficient to support the trial court's imposition of a constructive
trust.60
H. Joint Tenants
In Pitts v. United States,61 the Virginia Supreme Court, answer-
ing a question certified by the Fourth Circuit, held that promissory
56. Id. at 352, 402 S.E.2d at 34.
57. Id.
58. 242 Va. 242, 409 S.E.2d 148 (1991).
59. Id. at 244-45, 409 S.E.2d at 149-50.
60. Id. at 246-47, 409 S.E.2d at 151.
61. 242 Va. 254, 408 S.E.2d 901 (1991). Interestingly, the court determined that Code §
55-21 did not apply to the notes. That section provides that Code § 55-20, which converts
joint tenancies to tenancies in common, "shall not apply. . . to an estate conveyed. . . to
persons in their own right when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that
1992] 835
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notes received in exchange for real property held as tenants by the
entirety are similarly held, even though the notes do not include
-any survivorship language.
The Pittses owned a parcel of land as tenants by the entirety. In
1986, the Pittses conveyed the property to a partnership in ex-
change for two promissory notes secured by a deed of trust on the
property.6 2 In 1989, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a no-
tice of income tax lien against Mr. Pitts and notified the partner-
ship that all payments on the notes were to be made to the IRS.
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Mrs. Pitts that the notes,
like the real property conveyed to the partnership, were held by
the couple as tenants by the entirety. Therefore, the notes were
not subject to the rights of Mr. Pitts' individual creditors. 3
In Funches v. Funches,64 the Virginia Supreme Court considered
whether the surviving spouse of a decedent held a dower interest
in property which the decedent and the decedent's companion in a
bigamous marriage purportedly held as tenants by the entirety.
The court held that the deed conveying the property to the dece-
dent and his companion created a joint.tenancy with a right of
survivorship and that, upon the decedent's death, title vested in
his companion to the exclusion of the decedent's actual wife .6 The
court also noted that since the deed, and not the status of her rela-
tionship with the decedent, created the companion's interest in the
it was intended the part of the one dying should then belong to the others." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1986). The notes, according to the court, did not qualify as an "instru-
ment" as that term is used in § 55-21, but were a "memorial" of a chose in action. Pitts, 242
Va. at 260, 408 S.E.2d at 904.
Instead, the court followed its decision in Oliver v. Givens, 204 Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661
(1963) that proceeds from the sale of real property held as tenants by the entirety are also
held as tenants by the entirety, regardless of the manner of payment. Pitts, 242 Va. at 261,
408 S.E.2d at 904-05.
62. 242 Va. at 257, 408 S.E.2d at 902.
63. Id. at 261-62, 408 S.E.2d at 905.
64. 243 Va. 26, 413 S.E.2d 44 (1992). It is important to note that the results of this case
may have been very different under Virginia's Augmented Estate statute, set forth at Code §
64.1-16.1, which became effective on January 1, 1991. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1991). However, Code § 64.1-19.2 provides that the law in effect prior to that date will
govern the procedures for determining the rights of parties whose dower or curtesy interests
vested prior to that date. Id. § 64.1-19.2.
65. Funches, 243 Va. at 29, 413 S.E.2d at 46; see Gant v. Gant, 237 Va. 588, 379 S.E.2d
332 (1989) (conveyance of property as tenants by the entireties to husband and ex-wife after
divorce created joint tenancy with right of survivorship precluding dower interest of subse-
quent wife).
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property, the fact that the decedent and companion's marriage was
legally void did not affect the companion's survivorship rights.66
I. Landlord and Tenant
In Sentara Enterprises, Inc. v. CCP Associates,7 the Virginia
Supreme Court considered whether an equitable remedy would
save a tenant from the termination of a lease. The relevant lease
provision granted the tenant the right to extend the lease, pro-
vided that the tenant gave the landlord notice of the renewal at
least thirty days prior to the expiration of the current term. The
lease also specifically stated that failure to notify the landlord of
intent to renew would result in the automatic termination of the
lease." The tenant provided the landlord with notice of renewal
approximately ten days late. 9 The landlord executed a lease with
another tenant and demanded that the tenant relinquish the
premises.70
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the tenant's argument that
the landlord was estopped from treating the lease as terminated
stating:
The law is established that time is of the essence of an option to
renew a lease and the provision for notice of renewal is a condition
precedent upon which the tenant's right to renew depends. More-
over, equity will deny relief to a tenant where failure to give the
notice required by the agreement is due solely to the tenant's negli-
gence, unaccompanied by fraud, accident, mistake or surprise, and
unaffected by the landlord's conduct.71
66. Funches, 243 Va. at 30, 413 S.E.2d at 47.
67. 243 Va. 39, 413 S.E.2d 595 (1992).
68. Id. at 40, 413 S.E.2d at 595.
69. Id. at 41-42, 413 S.E.2d at 596. The tenant sent the landlord written notice of the
tenant's intent to extend the lease only after the landlord notified the tenant that the lease
had terminated and encouraged the tenant to contact the landlord if the tenant desired to
enter into a new lease. Id. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 596. Numerous letters from the landlord to
the tenant after the expiration of the term consistently maintained the landlord's position
that the lease had terminated and that the tenant occupied the premises under a month to
month lease. Id. at 41-42, 413 S.E.2d at 596.
70. Id. at 42, 413 S.E.2d at 596.
71. Id. at 44, 413 S.E.2d at 597-98 (citing McClellan v. Ashley, 200 Va. 38, 43-44, 104
S.E.2d 55, 58-59 (1958)).
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The court found nothing in the record assigning fault to the land-
lord for the tenant's failure to renew the lease, and therefore held
that the tenant was not entitled to an equitable remedy.72
In Walker v. Arrington,73 the Virginia Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a purported oral modification to a lease was sup-
ported by consideration. Arrington agreed to purchase property in
Powhatan County from Hardraker. As a condition to the sale, Har-
draker required Arrington to sign a lease with Walker, an existing
tenant occupying the property."4 On February 12, 1989, Arrington
and Walker entered into a lease for three years at a rental of
$1,000 per year to be paid on March 1 of each lease year, beginning
on March 1, 1989. The lease also granted Walker an option to
purchase the property for $15,000.71 Arrington's acquisition of the
property was delayed until April 19, 1989. Arrington and Walker
discussed some modifications to the lease as a result of Arrington's
late acquisition of the property, including postponing the due date
of the first rental payment and increasing the price of the option to
$16,500. The modifications were reduced to a writing but never
signed.7"
Walker failed to pay the first installment of rent as required by
the signed lease, but tendered payment in compliance with the oral
modifications to the lease. Arrington refused to accept the rent,
gave Walker notice of termination of the lease, and brought an un-
lawful detainer action to recover possession of the property.
Walker argued that the parties had orally agreed to extend the due
date of the rent payment. The trial court determined that even if
Arrington and Walker had orally agreed to extend the due date for
the first rent payment (which the court did not decide), the modifi-
cation was not supported by consideration.77
The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Walker's
oral agreement to increase the price for the option constituted ade-
quate consideration for Arrington's agreement to extend the due
date for the first rental installment. The court remanded the case
72. Id. at 45, 413 S.E.2d at 598.
73. 241 Va. 451, 403 S.E.2d 693 (1991).
74. Id. at 452, 403 S.E.2d at 694.
75. Id. at 452-53, 403 S.E.2d at 694.
76. Id. at 453, 403 S.E.2d at 694.
77. Id. at 454-55, 403 S.E.2d at 695.
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to the trial court to determine whether the parties had orally
agreed to modify the lease. 5
In United States v. Southern Management Corp.,79 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a recovering drug addict su-
pervised under a local drug addiction program is a handicapped
individual entitled to protection under the anti-discrimination pro-
visions of the Federal Fair Housing Act. In reaching its decision,
the court relied on both the legislative history of the Act and the
regulations adopted pursuant to the Act by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. 0 A crucial factor to the court
was the fact that the regulations characterize as "handicapped"
those individuals whose major life activities were limited, not by
the actual physical or mental limitations of the individual, but by
the lack of opportunities afforded by other people because of their
perception of the individual's prior drug use. 1
A lease that provides the tenant with an option to extend the
term for an additional five year term "at a mutually agreed rent" is
unenforceable for indefiniteness according to the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Cleve Marsh Hunt Club.2 Davis was a
case of first impression for the court.83 Tenants would be well ad-
vised to insist on the inclusion of fixed rentals, formulas, or other
specific methods of determining rent for renewal periods in leases.
J. Mechanic's Liens
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, a beneficiary of a deed of
trust inferior in lien to the mechanic's lien is a necessary party and
failure to join the beneficiary in the suit within the six-month limi-
tation period mandated by Code section 43-1711 is fatal to the suit,
78. Id. at 455-56, 403 S.E.2d at 695-96.
79. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992). Under the Act, a handicap is "(1) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2)
a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled sub-
stance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1990) (emphasis added).
80. 955 F.2d at 917-22; see 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (c) and (d).
81. 955 F.2d at 919 (following School Bd. of .Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987)).
82. 242 Va. 29, 405 S.E.2d 839 (1991).
83. Id. at 34, 405 S.E.2d at 842. The court noted, however, that its decision was consistent
with previous holdings in Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 45, 30 S.E. 457 (1898) and Taylor v.
King Cole Theatres, 183 Va. 117, 31 S.E.2d 260 (1944).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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according to the Virginia Supreme Court in James T. Bush Con-
struction Co. v. Patel."' The court explained that in its prior deci-
sions it acknowledged that due process required joining the benefi-
ciary of a deed of trust recorded prior to the recordation of a
mechanic's lien because the beneficiary had an interest in whether
or not the suit to enforce the mechanic's lien produced sufficient
proceeds to satisfy both the deed of trust and the mechanic's
lien. 6 The court found this reasoning even more compelling in
Patel where, since the deed of trust was inferior to the mechanic's
lien, the deed of trust may have been defeated by the suit to en-
force the mechanic's lien.87
The failure of a roofing material supplier's lien to apportion the
cost of the supplies among the units in a structure housing multi-
ple townhouse units was fatal to the validity of the lien according
to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Addington-Beaman
Lumber Co. v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n.s8 In reaching its
decision, the court emphasized that the roofing material supplier
provided the materials on an open account basis and not under "a
single interdependent contract requiring the general contractor to
buy and the supplier to sell."8 The court emphasized that the sup-
plier's dealings with the general contractor involved a documented
series of individual but related transactions that permitted the
supplier to allocate the costs of the roofing materials among the
various units.90
K. Partition
A life tenant does not have the right, to compel partition of the
property against the owners of the remainder according to the
85. 243 Va. 84, 412 S.E.2d 703 (1992); see VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
86. Patel, 243 Va. at 86-87, 412 S.E.2d at 704 (citing Mendenhall v. Cooper, 239 Va. 71,
387 S.E.2d 468 (1990) and Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223
(1986)).
87. Patel, 243 Va. at 88, 412 S.E.2d at 705 (citing Walt Robbins, Inc., 232 Va. at 47, 348
S.E.2d at 226).
88. 241 Va. 436, 403 S.E.2d 688 (1991).
89. Id. at 439, 403 S.E.2d at 689. Numerous individual invoices, delivery tickets and work
orders evidenced the open account relationship. Had there been one contract for the entire
project and no allocation of the purchase price to the several units, the supplier's blanket
lien may very well have been upheld. Id. at 440, 403 S.E.2d at 690; see Sergeant v. Denby,
87 Va. 206, 12 S.E. 402 (1890) (upholding joint lien for materials supplied and work per-
formed under single contract for an "entire work" consisting of two homes on two separate
lots).
90. Addington-Beaman, 241 Va. at 440-41, 403 S.E.2d at 690.
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court in Whitby v. Overton.91 The court noted that Virginia Code
section 8.01-8192 only authorizes tenants in common, joint tenants,
executors with the power to sell, and coparceners of real property
to compel partition." The life tenant could not qualify as a tenant
in common with the remaindermen because the parties did not
have coequal rights of occupancy. 4 Therefore, the life tenant could
not compel partition of the property.9 5
L. Resulting Trust
In Tiller v. Owen,96 the Virginia Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether a resulting trust arose in favor of Owen, a per-
son who contributed money toward another person's property
purchase. Tiller executed a purchase contract for a residence and
obtained a loan for the residence in her own name. Owen provided
Tiller with approximately $23,000 to purchase the residence and
subsequently paid almost two years of the debt service on the loan
until his relationship with Tiller terminated. Owen then sought to
establish an interest in the property by way of a resulting trust.9 7
The court determined that the facts before it did not satisfy the
elements of a resulting trust.98 "In order for a resulting trust to
arise, the would-be beneficiary must pay for the property, or as-
sume payment of all or part of the purchase money prior to or at
the time of purchase, and have legal title conveyed to another
without any mention of a trust in the conveyance. In addition, he
must have paid the purchase money as his own, and not as an
agent of the title holder, nor as a loan to the latter."'99 Since Owen
was not obligated either to buy the property or to repay the loan,
no resulting trust arose in his favor upon Tiller's acquisition of the
property.100
91. 243 Va. 20, 413 S.E.2d 42 (1992).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
93. Whitby, 243 Va. at 22, 413 S.E.2d at 43.
94. Id. at 24, 413 S.E.2d at 44.
95. Id.
96. 243 Va. 176, 413 S.E.2d 51 (1992).
97. Id. at 178, 413 S.E.2d at 52-53.
98. Id. at 180, 413 S.E.2d at 54.
99. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 53 (citing Leonard v. Counts, 221 Va. 582, 588, 272 S.E.2d 190, 194
(1980)).
100. Tiller, 243 Va. at 180, 413 S.E.2d at 54.
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M. Roll-Back Taxes
In City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enterprises, Inc.,10 1 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the city was
permitted to impose roll-back taxes upon a change in the zoning of
property to a more intensive use. The taxpayers, owners of approx-
imately 120 acres of land, agreed to sell the land to the Virginia
Beach Development Authority, a tax exempt entity. 102 The prop-
erty, then zoned for agricultural use, was enrolled in the city's land
use program.103
The Authority's obligation to purchase the property was contin-
gent on successfully rezoning the property from agricultural to
commercial uses. This contingency was satisfied and the authority
purchased the property. Shortly thereafter, the city assessed roll-
back taxes against the taxpayers even though the agricultural use
of the property did not change from the time that the taxpayers
owned it.o4 The supreme court, in construing Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3230, determined that rezoning the property to a non-
qualifying classification subjected the property to roll-back taxes
but that "the roll-back taxes cannot be assessed and collected until
the non-qualifying use occurs. "105
N. Zoning
A zoning administrator has no authority to determine whether a
land owner has vested rights in a land use, according to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Holland v. Johnson.0 6 "A vested right in a
land use is a property right which is created and protected by law.
101. 243 Va. 149, 413 S.E.2d 642 (1992).
102. Id. at 154, 413 S.E.2d at 644.
103. Id. at 151, 413 S.E.2d at 643; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3230 to -3244 (Repl. Vol.
1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992) (permitting localities to establish reduced tax assessments for
land preservation).
104. ESG Enterprises, Inc., 243 Va. at 151, 413 S.E.2d at 643.
105. Id. at 154, 413 S.E.2d at 645. The court found the following language in a 1988
amendment to the land use statute dispositive: "[r]eal property rezoned to a more intensive
use, at the request of the owner or his agent, shall be subject to the roll-back tax at the
time the zoning is changed." Id. at 152, 413 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting VA CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3237(D) (Repl. Vol. 1991)). According to the court, this provision does not entitle the local-
ity to assess roll-back taxes at the time the rezoning occurs, as the city argued. Instead, the
section requires the locality to calculate the roll-back taxes from the date of the rezoning,
instead of from the date the actual use of the property changed. Id. at 154, 413 S.E.2d at
645.
106. 241 Va. 553, 403 S.E.2d 356 (1991).
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An adjudication regarding the creation, existence, or termination
of that right can be made only by a court of competent
jurisdiction. '107
In Carmel v. City of Hampton,"0 8 the court considered the valid-
ity of an amendment to the city's zoning ordinance. Carmel ac-
quired title to a parcel of real property in 1981 for the purpose of
developing multi-family housing. Carmel had previously deter-
mined from city officials and from examining the zoning map that
the property was zoned R-M which permitted multi-family devel-
opment. 09 In 1986, however, the city refused to issue a building
permit to Carmel claiming that the property had not been properly
rezoned from R-13 (single-family residential) to R-M. The city as-
serted that a 1961 amendment to the city zoning ordinance
recharacterizing the property from R-13 to R-M was invalid be-
cause the amendment was not passed in strict compliance with the
city code." 0
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Carmel's position that
even if the ordinance was not properly enacted, section 15.1-503 of
the Virginia Code cured any defect in the adoption of the amended
ordinance."' Therefore, Carmel was entitled to the multi-family
zoning classification." 2
Evidence more substantial than a landowner's conclusory state-
ments about his inability to sell property must be presented to re-
quire a board of zoning appeals to issue a variance to a locality's
minimum setback requirements. The Virginia Supreme Court in
107. Id. at 556, 403 S.E.2d at 358; see VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
108. 241 Va. 457, 403 S.E.2d 335 (1991).
109. Id. at 458, 403 S.E.2d at 336.
110. Id. at 459, 403 S.E.2d at 337. Section 1-13 of the City Code provides that "[a]ll
ordinances passed by the council shall be in effect from and after the second reading and
passage of the ordinances." Id. The first reading of the ordinance resulted in a request for a
study on the construction of cooperative apartments. The ordinance was read a second time
and adopted at the next city council meeting. Id.
111. Carmel, 241 Va. at 460, 403 S.E.2d at 337. Virginia Code § 15.1-503 provides that:
All proceedings had in the preparation, certification and adoption of zoning ordi-
nances by every . . . city . . . prior to January 1, 1971, which shall have been in
substantial compliance with the provisions of [Chapter 11 of Title 15.1, entitled
"Planning, Subdivision of Land and Zoning,"] are validated and confirmed, and all
such zoning ordinances adopted or attempted to be adopted pursuant to the provi-
sions of this chapter are declared to be validly adopted and enacted, notwithstanding
any defects or irregularities in the adoption thereof.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
112. Carmel, 241 Va. at 460, 403 S.E.2d at 337.
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Board of Zoning Appeals v. Glasser Brothers Corp.113 held that
absent such evidence, the denial of a variance by the Board of Zon-
ing Appeals was not erroneous or clearly wrong.
A suit brought under Virginia Code section 15.1-493(G) 1I4 need
only be filed against the local governing body within thirty days
following the challenged decision, according to the Virginia Su-
preme Court in Friends of Clark Mountain Foundation v. Board
of Supervisors of Orange County." 5 In Friends of Clark Mountain
Foundation, several landowners sought to overturn the Board's ap-
proval of an application to rezone approximately twenty-five acres
of land from agricultural to industrial use. The landowners sought
a declaratory judgement under section 15.1-493(G) within the
thirty-day period, but only named the Board as a defendant. The
trial court dismissed the suit for failure to name the owner of the
twenty-five acre tract and the holder of an option to buy the land
as necessary parties.' 6
Integral to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to reinstate
the landowners' section 15.1-493(G) action was the court's determi-
nation that the thirty-day period established by the statute merely
imposed a statutory procedure for bringing the action and did not
establish a statute of limitations. 1  Therefore, the landowners'
failure to name all of the necessary parties within the thirty-day
period was not fatal to the action. The court did warn, however,
that "[a]fter the contesting action has been instituted and is pend-
ing. . . and the absence of a necessary party is noted of record,
the trial court should not adjudicate the controversy until that
party has intervened or has been brought into the proceeding. '" 18
II. LEGISLATION
The Virginia General Assembly recently passed, and Governor
Wilder approved, a number of important bills affecting property in
Virginia. The following is a brief summary of the most significant
legislation in the area of Virginia property law.
113. 242 Va. 197, 202, 408 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1991).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(G) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
115. 242 Va. 16, 406 S.E.2d 19 (1991).
116. 242 Va. at 19, 406 S.E.2d at 20.
117. Id. at 19-20, 406 S.E.2d at 22. Unlike a special statute of limitations, a statute of
repose or a pure statute of limitations, the court determined that the thirty-day period in §
15.1-493(G) was not jurisdictional in nature. Id.
118. Id. at 21, 406 S.E.2d at 22.
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A. Assignment of Leases and Rents
New Virginia Code section 55-220.1"9 provides that, upon recor-
dation of a deed or other instrument assigning the assignor's inter-
est in leases, rents or profits, the assignee's interest is fully per-
fected as to the assignor and all third parties without the necessity
of (i) furnishing notice to the assignor or tenant, (ii) obtaining pos-
session of the real property, (iii) impounding the rents, (iv) secur-
ing the appointment of a receiver, or (v) taking any other affirma-
tive action. The tenant is authorized to pay the assignor until the
tenant receives written notice that rents due or to become due
have been assigned and that payment is to be made to the
assignee. 1
20
B. Augmented Estates
The General Assembly made several amendments to the aug-
mented estates legislation which became effective in 1992. The first
important amendment is the addition of a much needed definition
of "bona fide purchaser" in new Virginia Code section 64.1-01.121
Knowledge of the seller's marital status, or the existence of a pre-
marital or marital agreement, does not affect a purchaser's charac-
terization as a bona fide purchaser. 2 2 In addition, the new section
establishes a safe harbor for lenders by providing that a commit-
ment to make a loan or the satisfaction of a pre-existing debt is
sufficient consideration to qualify a purchaser as a bona fide pur-
chaser for augmented estate purposes. 23
Amended Virginia Code section 64.1-16.1(3)(d) now limits the
reach-back provision of a decedent's augmented estate to the five
years preceding the year of the decedent's death. 24 As originally
adopted, the augmented estate statute placed no limitation on how
119. VA. ConE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 64.1-01 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 64.1-01 defines a bona fide purchaser as "a
purchaser of property for value who has acted in the transaction in good faith." Id. A pur-
chaser is defined as "one who acquires property by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mort-
gage, pledge, or lien or who otherwise deals with property in a voluntary transaction, other
than a gift." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. "[A]ny other consideration sufficient to support a simple contract" is sufficient
consideration to qualify a purchaser as a bona fide purchaser under the augmented estate
statute. Id.
124. Id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d) (Cur. Supp. 1992).
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:825
far back in time the augmented estate could reach to capture the
value of transferred property.12 5
The General Assembly also modified Virginia Code section 55-41
to make it clear that a spouse's execution of a deed or other con-
veyancing instrument constitutes the spouse's consent to the con-
veyance and joinder as provided in Virginia Code section 64.1-
16. 1.126
C. Commercial Real Estate Broker's Lien Act
New Virginia Code sections 55-517 and 55-518 create lien rights
in favor of a commercial real estate broker on rent paid by a ten-
ant procured by the broker upon terms provided in a written
agreement signed by the owner. 127 The amount of the lien is lim-
ited to the rent payable during the term of the lease or the first
sixty months of the term, whichever is less. 128
125. The General Assembly also narrowed the class of persons liable to make up the elec-
tive share of the survivor to certain fiduciaries given notice of the surviving spouse's claim of
an elective share in the decedent's estate, original transferees from the decedent, subsequent
recipients of gifts of the property from original transferees and persons claiming by testate
or intestate succession from original transferees to the extent that such transferees or subse-
quent recipients have the property or its proceeds. Id. § 64.1-16.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
126. Id. § 55-41 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
127. Id. §§ 55-517 and -518 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The broker's lien rights do not apply to
one to four unit improved residential properties, unimproved land, single family units leased
in condominiums, townhouses or apartment complexes, or real property enrolled in the land
use real estate tax program established pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3230 to -3244
(Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992). Id. § 55-517.
128. Id. § 55-518(A). The lien rights established by §§ 55-517 and -518 should be of spe-
cial concern to owners of rent-producing commercial properties and the owners' lenders.
Notwithstanding that Virginia Code § 55-518(A) provides that the owner of the property
must agree, as evidenced by a signed writing, to the broker's provision of services as a condi-
tion to the broker's lien arising, § 55-518(B) provides that the broker may unilaterally rec-
ord a memorandum of lien to perfect his lien rights. Id. § 55-518(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992). The
memorandum of lien, especially if inaccurate, could adversely affect the owner's financing on
the property. The owner's agreement with the broker should provide the owner with control
over the content and recordation of the memorandum of lien and, perhaps, provide that the
broker's lien will be subordinate to any financing obtained by the owner on the property.
The owner should also consider the broker's lien rights when arranging financing for the
project. For instance, the lender's deed of trust will likely restrict further encumbrances on
the property. The owner may want to obtain an exception from the lender for the broker's
lien. If that exception cannot be obtained, the owner may need to have the broker waive the
lien rights. Lenders may resist a request to permit the broker's lien even though the broker's
efforts contribute to the production of income from the property. Issues as to the priority of
the lender's deed of trust and other security instruments over the broker's memorandum of
lien should also be addressed with the broker at the time that the broker is retained.
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D. Condominium Act
The Virginia Condominium Act underwent three amendments of
note. First, the records which a condominium association may
withhold from inspection by its members have been expanded.129
Second, section 55-79.83(B) now expressly provides that the associ-
ation may charge reasonable user fees for limited common ele-
ments. Finally, the time in which suit must be brought by a condo-
minium association to enforce a lien for assessments has been
increased from six months to twenty-four months after the date
that the memorandum of lien is filed.'30
E. Deeds of Trust
Lenders should find comfort in two additions to Virginia Code
section 55-59. New Virginia Code section 55-59(9)131 provides that
a secured lender under a deed of trust or the holders of more than
fifty percent of the monetary obligations secured by the deed of
trust have the right to appoint a substitute trustee with the same
effect and under the same terms as provided in Virginia Code sec-
tion 26-49,131 even if that right is not expressly granted in the deed
of trust.133
An addition to section 55-59(5) provides that, in the absence of a
contrary provision in a deed of trust, a grantor is deemed to cove-
nant that if a secured lender makes advances with respect to a
prior lien in order to protect the lender's deed of trust or the
lender's lien, the advances, together with interest thereon, are
added to the amounts secured by the lender's deed of trust.13 4
129. Id. § 55-79.74:1(B). The records which may be so withheld are basically the same as
those which may be withheld by a homeowners' association. See infra notes 162, 163 and
accompanying text.
130. Id. § 55-79.84(D).
131. Id. § 55-59(9) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
132. Id. § 26-49 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
133. The new section would seem to eliminate the need to obtain court approval for the
appointment of a trustee in those cases where the deed of trust does not provide a power of
appointment exercisable by the lender in situations where a trustee resigns, dies or becomes
incompetent to act as trustee. However, it is unclear whether the lender's right to appoint a
substitute trustee extends to the right to substitute a trustee at the sole discretion of the
lender and without cause.
134. Id. § 55-59(5) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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F. Easements
An addition to Virginia Code section 55-50 provides that the
owner of land subject to an easement for ingress and egress may
relocate the easement on the servient estate by recording, in the
clerk's office of the circuit court of the county or city in which the
easement is located, a written agreement evidencing the consent of
all affected persons and setting forth the new location of the ease-
ment.1"5 In the absence of such an agreement, the owner of the
servient estate may seek relocation of the easement upon petition
to the circuit court and notice to all parties in interest. The court
must grant the petition if, after a hearing, the court finds that (1)
the relocation will not result in economic damage to the parties in
interest, (2) there will be no undue hardship created by the reloca-
tion, and (3) the easement has been in existence for not less than
ten years. 136
G. Foreclosure
The General Assembly modified the notice requirements for
non-judicial foreclosures contained in Virginia Code section 55-
59.1.137 Foreclosure notices must now be sent to both the present
owner of the property and to subordinate lienholders, provided
that the subordinate lienholder's deed of trust was recorded at
least thirty days prior to the proposed foreclosure and the
lienholder's address is recorded with the deed of trust. 38 A new
provision in the section protects the trustee and secured party
from liability arising from the inadvertent failure to give notice as
required by the section. 39
New Virginia Code section 55-59.2(E) provides that "failure to
comply with the requirements for advertisement contained in [Sec-
tion 55-59] . ..shall, upon petition, render a sale of the property
voidable by the court."' 40 Formerly, it was unclear whether failure
135. Id. § 55-50 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The section does not define "affected persons." How-
ever, it probably includes the owner of the dominant estate.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 55-59.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
138. Id. § 55-59.1. The right to notice also applies to the assignee of a note secured by a
subordinate deed of trust, provided that the assignment and address of the assignee are
likewise recorded at least thirty days prior to the proposed foreclosure. Id. Notices to
subordinate lienholders may be given by regular mail, instead of certified mail. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 55-59.2(2)(E) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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to comply with the advertisement requirements rendered the sale
void or voidable.
H. Implied Warranties on New Homes
Home purchasers now enjoy a five year warranty on foundations
of new homes purchased from builders.' 4 '
I. Landlord and Tenant
A tenant may avoid losing possession of a residence at any time
prior to the first court return date in an unlawful detainer action
by tendering to the landlord all arrearages, interest, reasonable at-
torney's fees and late charges provided for in the lease. 42 However,
the tenant may invoke this right only once during any year. 43
Section 55-248.11:1 of the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act has been amended regarding the preparation of reports
itemizing existing damages to units upon a new tenant's
occupancy.14 4
141. Id. § 55-70.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
142. Id. § 55-243. In an action for ejectment, the tenant has the same right to tender the
arrearages, late charges, interest, and reasonable attorney's fees contracted for in the lease
and terminate the ejectment action. However, tender of funds to cure the default must be
made prior to trial on the ejectment action. Id.
143. Id. § 55-243(B). Section 55-243(B) provides that "[i]n cases of unlawful detainer, the
tenant may invoke the rights granted by this section no more than one time during any
twelve-month period of continuous residency in the rental dwelling unit." It appears that
this limitation only applies to unlawful detainer actions and not ejectment actions.
144. Id. § 55-248.11:1. A landlord may allow a new tenant to prepare and submit the
existing damage report to the landlord in which case the report will be binding on the land-
lord unless objected to within five days after receipt. However, the landlord must establish
this policy in writing. Id. The landlord may also establish a written policy requiring the
landlord and tenant to prepare the report jointly. Id.
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J. Mechanics' Liens
Amendments to Virginia Code section 43-1145 and new sections
36-98.01,146 43-4.01 14 and 43-13.2148 establish a procedure for com-
145. Id. § 43-1 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 43-1 defines a mechanics lien agent as:
a person (i) designated in writing by the owner of the real estate or a person author-
ized to act on behalf of the owner of such real estate and (ii) who consents in writing
to act as the owner's designee for purposes of receiving notice pursuant to § 43-4.01.
Such person shall be an attorney at law licensed to practice in the Commonwealth, a
title insurance company authorized to write title insurance in the Commonwealth or
one of its subsidiaries or licensed title insurance agents, or a financial institution au-
thorized to accept deposits and to hold itself out to the public as engaged in the
banking or savings institution business in the Commonwealth or a service corpora-
tion, subsidiary or affiliate of such financial institution.
Id.
146. Id. § 36-98.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 36-98.01 provides that, in addition to any
information required by the Uniform Statewide Building Code, a building permit issued for
any one- or two-family residential dwelling unit shall at the time of issuance contain, at the
request of the applicant, the name, mailing address, and telephone number of a MLA as
defined in § 43-1. If the applicant does not designate an MLA, the building permit will
indicate that fact by stating "None Designated." Id.
147. Id. § 43-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 43-4.01 contains the following procedures
for notifying potential mechanic's lien claimants of the MLA's identity and the steps that
the potential claimants must take to preserve their lien right:
A. The building permit for any one- or two-family residential dwelling unit issued
pursuant to the Uniform Statewide Building Code shall be continuously posted on
the property for which the permit is issued until all work is completed on the prop-
erty. The permit shall be posted on the property before any labor is performed or any
material is furnished on the property for which the building permit is issued.
B. If, at the time of issuance, the building permit contains the name, mailing address,
and telephone number of the [MLA] . . . any person entitled to claim a lien under
this title may notify the [MLA] . . . that he seeks payment for labor performed or
material furnished by registered or certified mail or by physical delivery. Such notice
shall contain (i) the name, mailing address, and telephone number of the person
sending such notice, (ii) the building permit number on the building permit, (iii) a
description of the property as shown on the building permit, and (iv) a statement
that the person filing such notice seeks payment for labor performed or material fur-
nished. A return receipt or other receipt showing delivery of the notice to the ad-
dressee or written evidence that such notice was delivered by the postal service or
other carrier to but not accepted by the addressee shall be prima facie evidence of
receipt. An inaccuracy in the notice as to the description of the property shall not bar
a person from claiming a lien under this title or filing a memorandum or otherwise
perfecting or enforcing a lien as provided in subsection C if the property can other-
wise be reasonably identified from the description.
C. Except as provided otherwise in this subsection, no person other than a person
claiming a lien under § 43-3(b) may claim a lien under this title or file a memoran-
dum or otherwise perfect and enforce a lien under this title with respect to a one-or
two-family residential dwelling unit if such person fails to notify any [MLA] . . .
identified on the building permit in accordance with subsection B above (i) within
thirty days of the first date that he performs labor or furnished material to or for the
building or structure or (ii) within thirty days of the date such permit is issued, if
such labor or materials are first performed or furnished by such person prior to the
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municating information about suppliers and laborers who may
have a right to file liens against residential property to a mechan-
ics' lien agent (MLA), a central repository for this information, and
a procedure that suppliers and laborers must comply with to pre-
serve their rights to file liens against the property. Basically, a sup-
plier or laborer must give the mechanics' lien agent, whose identity
and address is disclosed on the posted building permit for the resi-
dence, notice that the supplier or laborer is working on the project
issuance of a building permit. However, the failure to give any such notices within the
appropriate thirty-day period as required by the previous sentence shall not bar a
person from claiming a lien under this title, provided that such lien is limited to labor
performed or materials furnished on or after the date a notice is given by such person
to the [MLA] . . . in accordance with subsection B above. A person performing labor
or furnishing materials with respect to a one- or two-family residential dwelling unit
on which a building permit is not posted at the time he first performs his labor or
first furnishes his material shall determine from appropriate authorities whether a
permit of the type described in subsection B above has been issued and the date on
which it is issued. No person shall be required to comply with this subsection as to
any memorandum of lien which is recorded prior to the issuance of a building permit
nor shall any person be required to comply with this subsection when the building
permit does not designate a [MLA] . . . .
D. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the only duties of the [MLA] . . . shall be to
receive notices delivered to him pursuant to subsection B and to provide any notice
upon request to a settlement agent, as defined in § 6.1-2.10, involved in a transaction
relating to the residential dwelling unit.
E. [MLAs] . . . are authorized to enter into written agreements with third parties
with regard to funds to be advanced to them for disbursement, and the transfer, dis-
bursement, return and other handling of such funds shall be governed by the terms of
such written agreements.
F. An [MLA] . . . may charge a reasonable fee for services rendered in connection
with administration of notice authorized herein and the disbursement of funds for
payment of labor and materials for the construction or repair of improvements on
real estate.
148. Id. § 43-13.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 43-13.2 provides that:
A person who is both the owner of a one- or two-family residential dwelling unit
and either a developer of such property, a contractor in connection with the develop-
ment or improvement of such property or a contractor or subcontractor furnishing
labor or material in connection with the development or improvement of such prop-
erty shall, at the time of settlement on the sale of such property, provide the pur-
chaser with an affidavit stating either (i) that all persons performing labor or furnish-
ing materials in connection with the improvements on such property and with whom
such owner is in privity of contract have been paid in full or (ii) the name, address
and amount payable or claimed to be payable to any person so performing labor or
furnishing materials and with whom such owner is in privity of contract. Willful fail-
ure to provide such statement or any willful material misrepresentation with respect
to such a statement which causes a monetary loss to a financial institution, title com-
pany, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, owner, [MLA] . . . or any other person or
institution shall be punishable as a Class 5 felony.
Id. The penalty described in § 43-13.2 is the same one prescribed for presenting a forged
lien waiver under Code § 43-13.1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-13.2.(Repl. Vol. 1990).
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as a condition to the supplier or laborer filing a mechanics' lien
against the residence.
An amendment to section 43-3149 expands the scope of work for
which mechanic's liens may be filed. The broader provision would
permit architects, engineers and other designers to file valid liens
for planning and design work.
K. Recordation and Filing Fees
The filing fee charged by clerks of the circuit courts for financing
statements, continuation statements and assignments of financing
statements is now ten dollars for the first ten names and one dollar
for each name in excess of ten.150 In addition, the cost of recording
a partnership certificate pursuant to Virginia Code section 50-75151
is ten dollars plus one dollar for each name after the first two and
ten dollars for recording an assumed name certificate pursuant to
section 59.1-74.152
L. Residential Sales Contract Disclosures
Beginning on July 1, 1993, home sellers will need to comply with
the new disclosure and disclaimer requirements imposed by Vir-
ginia Code section 54.1-2105111 and sections 55-517 through 55-
525.15 These sections require the owners of residential property to
make full disclosure of the physical condition of the property being
149. Id. § 43-3 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 43-3 adds labor or materials for site develop-
ment improvements and for stormwater facilities to the list of items for which mechanics'
liens may be filed against individual lots in a development or condominium for a pro rata
share of the cost of providing access or service to the individual lots or units. Id. § 43-3(b).
"Site development improvements" are defined as "improvements which are provided for the
development, such as project site grading, rather than for an individual lot." Id.
150. Id. §§ 8.9-403(5) and -405(2) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
151. Id. § 50-75 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
152. Id. § 59.1-74 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
153. Id. § 54.1-2105 (Cum. Supp. 1992). Section 54.1-2105 directs the Virginia Real Estate
Board to "develop a residential property disclaimer statement form and a residential prop-
erty disclosure statement form for use in accordance with the provisions of § 55-519." Id.
154. Id. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Cum. Supp. 1992). In addition to sales, exchanges and install-
ment sales contracts, the disclosure requirements contained in § 55-518 apply to leases with
options to buy one to four residential unit properties. Id. § 55-517.
Section 55-518 lists the various transactions that are exempt from the disclosure require-
ments, some of which include foreclosure sales, conveyances by deeds in lieu of foreclosure,
sales by deed of trust beneficiaries who have acquired the property by foreclosure or deed in
lieu of foreclosure, transfers between co-owners, transfers between certain family members
and the first sale of new dwellings. Id. § 55-518.
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sold or a full disclaimer of the condition of property being sold "as
is., 5
5
The owner is required to make the disclosure (not the agent or
broker) based on the owner's actual knowledge and is not obligated
to undertake any independent investigation. 56 The disclosure
must be provided by the seller to the purchaser prior to the execu-
tion of a contract by all of the parties.157 Otherwise, the purchaser
has the right to cancel the contract, without penalty, until settle-
ment or an earlier date as set forth in section 55-520.58 The owner
is also obligated to disclose any additional or changed information
brought to the owner's attention prior to settlement. 59
In the event of a misrepresentation or omission in the disclosure,
the purchaser's remedy is actual damages resulting from the error
or nondisclosure.160 However, there are no limitations on the reme-
dies that a purchaser may pursue if the owner's misrepresentation
as to the condition of the property is intentional or willful. 6 '
New Virginia Code section 11-2.411 requires that every contract
for the purchase of residential real property made on or after July
1, 1992, must include a warning notice regarding the possibility of
unfiled mechanics' liens against the property. However, failure to
155. Id. § 55-519 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
156. Id. § 55-519(2).
157. Id. § 55-520(A).
158. Id. § 55-520(B).
159. Id. § 55-522.
160. Id. § 55-524(B); see id. § 55-521 (owner not liable for error, inaccuracy or omission if
not within the actual knowledge of the owner, supplied to owner by governmental agencies
or professional engineer or inspector, or owner not grossly negligent in obtaining the
information).
161. Id. § 55-524(2).
162. Id. § 11-2.4 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The disclosure required is as follows:
NOTICE:
Virginia law (§ 43-1 et seq.) permits persons who have performed labor or fur-
nished materials for the construction, removal, repair or improvement of any building
or structure to file a lien against the property. This lien may be filed at any time after
the work is commenced or the material is furnished, but not later than the earlier of
(i) 90 days from the last day of the month in which the lienor last performed work or
furnished materials or (ii) 90 days from the time the construction, removal, repair or
improvement is terminated.
AN EFFECTIVE LIEN FOR WORK PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF
SETTLEMENT MAY BE FILED AFTER SETTLEMENT. LEGAL COUNSEL
SHOULD BE CONSULTED.
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include the notice required by section 11-2.4 will not render the
contract void.
M. Subdivision Plats
Amended Virginia Code section 15.1-475111 provides, among
other things, that an approved final subdivision plat which has
been recorded or an approved final site plan shall be valid for a
period of not less than five years from the date of approval or for
such longer period as the local commission or other agency may, at
the time of approval, determine to be reasonable, taking into con-
sideration the size and phasing of the proposed development.
N. Title Insurance Disclosure
In an effort to promote the education of home purchasers about
the availability of title insurance, the General Assembly added Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-4616 which requires a settlement agent to
inform the purchaser of the benefits of title insurance and that the
purchaser may wish to obtain title insurance and obtain a state-
ment from the purchaser that the disclosure was made. 164
0. Virginia Property Owners' Association Act
The General Assembly clarified the applicability of the Virginia
Property Owners' Association Act' by amending section 55-
508(A). That section now provides that the Act applies to property
owners' associations organized after January 1, 1959.1 Section 55-
508(B) now expressly provides that the act does not apply to "any
nonstock, nonprofit, taxable corporation with nonmandatory mem-
bership which, as its primary function, makes available golf, ski
and other recreational facilities both to its members and the gen-
eral public."' 7
Section 55-510 now provides that a homeowners' association
member in good standing may inspect and copy the association's
163. Id. § 15.1-475 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
164. Id. § 38.2-4616 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The settlement agent must also notify the pur-
chaser that title insurance will not cover the value of subsequent improvements to the prop-
erty. The statement must be obtained prior to the time that any funds are disbursed. Id.
165. Id. 88 55-508 to -516 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
166. Id. § 55-508(A).
167. Id. 8 55-508(B).
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membership list, except for commercial purposes. 168 However, the
list of records which may be withheld from inspection have been
expanded and clarified. 169 New section 55-510(E) lists the topics
which may be addressed by the association's board of directors in
closed session and establishes a procedure by which the board may
convene in closed session and effect decisions made by the board in
closed session. 7 0
Section 55-514 has been clarified by providing that a majority of
the association's membership may reduce a special assessment ap-
proved by the board of directors, as well as rescind the
assessment.'
III. CONCLUSION
The Virginia Supreme Court has addressed a number of inter-
esting issues over the past year, including the extent to which ease-
ments may be improved, the proper characterization of promissory
notes received by a husband and wife in exchange for property
held as tenants by the entirety, and the rights of a life tenant to
compel the partition of property against the owners of the
remainder.
The many statutes recently enacted and amended by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly will have a significant impact on Virginia
practitioners. Amendments to the augmented estate statute help to
clarify the scope of the statute and may help to quell some of the
grumbling coming from attorneys engaged in closing real estate
transactions.
With the passage of the residential sales contract disclosure stat-
utes, the General Assembly has taken a significant step away from
Virginia's "buyer beware" rule. However, sellers may escape pro-
viding the disclosure by agreeing to sell residential property with-
out any form of representation regarding the condition of the
property. The disclosure statute becomes effective on July 1, 1993.
However, attorneys involved with residential real estate closings
168. Id. § 55-510.
169. See id. § 55-510(C). New items to the list of items which may be withheld from
inspection include records concerning agreements containing confidentiality requirements,
pending litigation, disclosure of information in violation of law, and minutes of executive
session board meetings. Id.
170. Id. § 55-510(E).
171. Id. § 55-514.
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should devote some attention to the statute and the disclosure
forms and disclaimer language being prepared by the Virginia Real
Estate Board.
